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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 19140

RONNIE LEE CRIPPS,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by information with
Distribution of A Controlled substance for value, Utah Code
Ann.§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii)

(1953), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value on
February 25, 1983 in the Seventh Judicial District Court of
Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell
presiding.

on April 12, 1983, appellant was sentenced to an

indeterminate term of confinement in the Utah State Prison not
to exceed five years.

Execution of the sentence was suspended

and appellant was placed on probation for a period of eighteen
months with a thirty day jail term and fined

$1,ooo.oo.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the verdict and judgment of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Undercover Officer Russell Spann of the Narcotics
and Liquor Law

Bureau, Department of Safety of the

State of Utah (T. 45) met appellant at a beer-keg party at
appellant's residence on June 19, 1981 in Carbonville, Utah
(T. 46) Officer Spann had been invited by appellant's roommate
earlier that evening while they were at the Comic Book Lounge
in Helper, Utah, (T. 55) and arrived at the party around
midnight to join approximately thirty other guests (T. 56).
While at the party, Office Spann was asking people whether
they had any marijuana, cocaine or LSD to sell (T. 58).
During this conversation, appellant asked Spann if
Spann could offer him a job at various oil fields (T. 60).
Although Spann was posing as an oil field laborer, he did not
either offer appellant a job or promise to help appellant find
a job (T. 75).

In response to Spann's request for a bag of

marijuana, appellant "told him it was too late; I didn't know
where to get one that time of night, anyway,

for sure.

But I

was drunk and I did tell him I could probably find one the
next morning if he wanted to come back."

(T. 114-15).

Officer Spann returned to appellant's residence the
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next morning but no one was home (T. 62) .1
Officer Spann had no further contact with appellant
(T. 63)

until 2:05 p.m. on July 1, 1981.

Spann arrived at

appellants' residence with Officer Mike Kagie of the West
Valley Police Department (T. 76) and Patricia Hall of the Utah
State Narcotics Division (T. 83).

Neither Spann, Kagie or

Hall had notified appellant of their visit (T. 70,80,86).
Spann explained to appellant that they were on their way to
Monticello, Utah and had just dropped by to see how appellant
was doing (T. 47).
Appellant invited the three undercover officers to
come into his house and smoke a joint (T. 47).

Officers Hall

and Kagie sat on a couch in the livingroom (T. 77, 84) as
Spann followed appellant into the kitchen (T. 48).

Appellant

picked up a cookie sheet type pan, a sifter and went to the
flour bin from which he pulled out a half pound of marijuana
(T. 48).

While in the kitchen, Spann asked appellant "if he

knew of anybody who had marijuana to sell of if he had any
marijuana to sell"

(T. 48-49).

Appellant replied that he did

and asked how much Spann wanted.
meaning an ounce.

Spann answered, "A bag"

(T. 48-49).

Returning to the livingroom, appellant rolled two
joints which were passed around (T. 49, 78, 84).

At 2:23 p.m.

l Appellant remembered seeing Spann the morning after the
party but could not remember going to bed ( T. 120) or whether
or not he had gone to Salt Lake (T. 121) as he later told
Officer Spann (T. 63)).
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appellant asked Spann, "DO you still want one?"

(T. 49)

Spann

asked the price (T. 49).

Appellant stated the price at $50,

to which Spann agreed (T.

49, 78, 84).

Appellant left for the kitchen, returned through the
livingroom into a small side room and came back carrying a
cardboard box containing scales ( T. 49, 78-79, 85).

In the

kitchen, appellant measured out approxiamtely an ounce of
marijuana (T. S2) and took $SO from Officer Spann (T. 49, 79).
After this exchange, Spann inquired whether
appellant could either sell or help him buy a pound or half
pound of marijuana (T. SO).

Appellant said that he usually

had a pound on hand, but did not have the quantity at that
time (T. SO, 63).

But being familiar with the county,

appellant claimed to know where one could be obtained and that
Spann should contact him again when wanting to purchase more
marijuana (T. SO, 63).
Officers Spann, Hall and Kagie then left appellant's
residence.

An

arrest warrant for appellant was issued on

December 4, 1981.
Appellant testified that at the June 19 party, agent
Spann agreed to "keep an eye open and stop back in and let me
know if he heard there was anything open or anything he could
help me out with."

(T. 114).
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ARGUMENT
--POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY ON THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ENTRAPMENT.
Appellant contends that Jury Instruction #6 on
Entrapment constituted prejudicial error because (a) the
instruction required that the police conduct "would be
effective" rather than "would create a substantial risk" of
the offense being committed, and (6) the "average person"
language of the instruct ion raised the standard of entrapment
in violation of statutory definitions making it harder for the
appellant to prove entrapment.
Entrapment is an affirmative defense as defined in
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-2-303 (1)(1953), as amended.

It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting
in co-operation with the officer induces
the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for
prosecution by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it.
Conduct merely affording a
person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
Jury Instruciton #6 explained entrapment as:
The Defendant in this case is asserting
the defense of entrapment.
Entrapment
occurs when a law enforcement officer or a
person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to
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obtain evidence of the commission for
prosectuion by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it.
Conduct merely afording [sic]
a person an opportunity to commit an
offense does not constitute entrapment.
In assessing police conduct under the
defense of entrapment, the test to
determine an unlawful entrapment is
whether a law enforcement official or an
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the
commission of an offense, induced the
Defendant to commit such an offense by
persuasion or inducement which would be
effective to presuade [sic] an average
person, other than one who was merely
given the opportunity to commit the
offense.
The Defendant need not prove that
entrapment occured [sic] to be entitled to
a not guilty verdict; it is sufficient if
there exists a reasonable doubt as to
whether the offense committed was the
product of the Defendant's voluntary will
or desire, or was induced by the
persistent requests or other inducive
conduct of the officer in this case; and
if there is such a reasonable doubt when
you should find the Defendant not guilty.
( R. 32).
Appellant's first contention stresses the "would be
effective" language from the second paragraph of Instruction
#6.

Jury instructions are not to be considered in isolation,

but as a whole.

State v. Ruben, Utah, 663 P.2d 445 (1983).

State v. Coffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777 (1977); State v. Crisola,
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968).

Considered as a whole,

the purpose of the second paragraph of Instruction #6 was to
explain the objective standard of entrapment adopted in State
v. Taylor, Utah,

599 P.2d 496 (1979).

The emphasis of the

second paragraph is the standard of police conduct, not the
degree of risk or probability of effect.
-6-

The first paragraph

of Instruction #6 clearly states the statutory description of
"methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it."
Ann.§ 76-2-303(1), Instruction #6 (R. 32).

Utah Code

The jury was

instructed clearly that police methods need only create a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a
person not otherwise ready to commit it for there to be
entrapment and therefore the instant instruction adhered to
the statutory standard.
Appellant's second claim finds fault with the
"average person" language from the second paragraph of
Instruction #6.

Appellant argues that by focusing upon the

"average person" the trial court was imposing a more stringent
burren on the defendant than is statutorily required.
However, the jury instruction read as a whole clearly
explained to the jurors the objective standard of entrapment
adopted by this Court in State v. Taylor.
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test
of entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d
148, 369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962).

The subjective test asked (1)

whether the re was an inducement and ( 2) if so, whether the
defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense. 2

2 The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. United
States, 287 u.s. 435, 53 s.ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 0932); see
62 A.L.R. 3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of the Law
Concerning Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense--State Case,
2(a), P. 114.
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Although

was construed initially as consistent

with the enactment in 1973

76-2-301(1),3 this Court

later recognized that the explicit wording of

§

76-2-303(1)

incorporates an objective standard of entrapment.

State v.

Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979).
The objective test focuses not on the predisposition
of the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed
in the particular case falls below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power."
Id. at 500.

The test to determine an unlawful entrapment

examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense."
at 503.

Id.

Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme

pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of
inordinate sums of money."

!aylor, at 503; Grossman v. State,

457 P.2d 226-230 (Ak. 1969).
Utah's statute on entrapment follows the format and
objective theory set forth in

2.13(1) of the Model Penal

Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962) and the alternative
provision offered in Tentative Draft No. 9,
Code.

Taylor at 502.

§

2.10 Model Penal

The comments clearly stress that on the

3 State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975).
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objective view of entrapement,

"" mere offer to buy narcotics

from someone without a predisposition to sell would not raise
the defense unless the offer created a substantial risk of a
sale by those who were not ready to commit the offense.
Comments

2.10 at 19.

§

The police agent's offer to buy must

create a substantial risk for one without the predisposition
in order for entrapment to lie.
Instruction #6 quotes directly the language adopted
in !aylor at 503.

Read as a whole, Instruction #6 adequately

and accurately instructed the jury on the defense of
entrapment.
Although appellant does not argue on appeal that he
presented sufficient evidence to prove entrapment, appellant
was not entrapped on the facts of this case.

Officer Spann's

behavior was not of such a character as to create a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one
not otherwise ready to commit it.

Appellant's response at the

June 19 party was not a refusal to sell to Agent Spann but
merely a statement of inconvenience or unavailability.

on

a

routine follow-up without great emotional appeal or promises
of employment, Agent Spann was invited into appellant's home
and offered an ounce of marijuana.

Appellant made

representations of future sales in larger quantities.
Appellant was not entrapped.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly instructed the i ut·y on the
legal standard for entrapment
§

76-2-303(1)

under Utah Cnd<> Ann.

(1953), as amended.

The objective theory of

entrapment was adequately explained when the
of police methods creating a substantial

trial court spoke

risk that the offense

would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
The jury instruction was a clear paraphrase of
State v.

Taylor, Utah,

entrapment statute.

language from

599 P.2d 496 (1979) and this state's

Appellant's conviction should be

affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY dated this

of March, 1984.
L. WILKINSO
G

__
/

--

EPHEN MIKITA
sistant Attorney General
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Jfi!!: day

of March, 1984.
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